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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers doctrine of the federal constitution'
does not apply to the states.' While fourteenth amendment due
process requires separation of powers in some limited circum-
stances, 3 the states are generally free to devise systems of govern-
ment most responsive to their needs. South Carolina has central-
ized its fiscal affairs in the South Carolina State Budget and
Control Board.4 This body, which serves administrative, quasi-
legislative and executive functions, is comprised of the governor,
the State treasurer, the comptroller general, the chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, and the chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee of the House of Representatives.5 All members
serve in ex officio capacities.
In State ex. rel. McLeod v. Edwards' South Carolina's attor-
ney general invoked the original jurisdiction of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court 7 to challenge the constitutionality of the
Board's composition. He argued that the membership of the two
legislators on the Board violated State constitutional provisions
that mandate separation of powers8 and vest executive authority
solely with the Governor. 9 The court rejected these arguments,
relying on three similar holdings made within the past decade.",
Although McLeod did little to clarify this ambiguous area of
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, § 6, cl. 2; art. II, § 1; art. I, § 1.
2. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
3. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927).
4. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 1-11-10 to -210 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The Board is divided
into three divisions: the Finance Division, the Purchasing and Property Division and the
Division of Personnel Administration. Id. § 1-11-20.
5. Id. § 1-11-10.
6. 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
7. S.C. CONsT. art. V, §§ 4, 5; S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-310 (1976); S.C. Sup. CT. R.
20, § 1.
8. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "In the government of this State, the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other, and no person or persons exercising the function of one of said depart-
ments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."
9. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "The supreme executive authority of this state shall be
vested in a Chief Magistrate, who shall be styled 'The Governor of the State of South
Carolina.'"
10. Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972); Mims v. McNair, 252
S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969); Elliot v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
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State law," the result reached is consistent with early decisions
of the court and expands the permissible scope of legislative ac-
tivity in areas traditionally reserved for executive action.
South Carolina's constitution contains four provisions re-
quiring the separation of powers: two proscriptions against dual
office holding,'2 a general separation of powers statement,' 3 and
a clause vesting executive authority solely in the governor.'4 All
have been used to attack legislators' positions on governing bod-
ies.
An early South Carolina decision dealing with whether a
legislator's service on quasi-executive administrative bodies vio-
lated the State's separation of powers requirement was State ex
rel. Ray v. Blease.'5 Blease was a challenge to the composition of
the State Sinking Fund Commission. The Commission, com-
prised of the attorney general, the comptroller general, the State
treasurer, and the chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, undertook to redeem stocks and bonds by issuing new
debentures. The plaintiff argued that the legislator's service on
the Commission violated the proscriptions against dual office
holding. The court held that the legislator's position was not an
office, but a device that allowed him to discharge the duties
"merely incident" to his office. 6 This holding has developed into
the test that still prevails in evaluating the permissible scope of
legislative involvement in what is otherwise an executive func-
tion. Legislators may engage in activities if they are incidental to
the duties of their legislative offices.
Two additional cases in the Blease line applied this test in
challenges involving the other separation of powers provisions of
the constitution and began to specify the types of activities that
are "merely incident" to the legislative function. Spartanburg
County v. Miller" was a county treasurer's suit claiming that
legislation authorizing the county delegation to direct an audit of
county offices constituted legislative usurpation of executive
11. The cases cited in note 10, supra, are virtually useless in attempting to under-
stand the considerations presented by South Carolina's doctrine of separation of powers.
In all three cases, the court summarily decided the issue of the constitutionality of the
Budget and Control Board's composition and focused on the challenges to the validity of
various bond acts.
12. S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 3; art. XVII, § 1A.
13. Id. art. I, § 8.
14. Id. art. IV, § 1.
15. 95 S.C. 403, 79 S.E. 247 (1913).
16. Id. at 411, 79 S.E. at 251.
17. 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 673 (1924).
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powers that the constitution reserves for the governor. Although
the court recognized that the legislature's function is to create
rather than administer laws, it upheld the enactment. The court
stated that the legislature may "engage in the discharge of such
functions, to the extent, and to the extent only, that their per-
formance is reasonably incidental to the full and effective exercise
of its legislative powers."' 8 The court reasoned that because the
legislature could lawfully pass statutes establishing county gov-
ernments, investigation of the implementation of these statutes
was a permissible activity.'9 Investigation, then, is an activity
incidental to legislative duties.
Bramlette v. Stringer0 followed Miller. In Bramlette an act
granting a county delegation discretion in financing and supervis-
ing new road building was held to be a violation of the general
separation of powers provision of the State constitution. Although
the court found that the discretionary purchasing power vested
in the delegation was not incidental to the members' duties as
legislators, it indicated that under some circumstances legislative
supervision falls within the Blease test.' Miller and Bramlette,
then, expanded the applicability of the Blease test by employing
it under the constitutional provisions mandating separation of
powers and outlining the executive function. These cases also
specified two activities, investigation and supervision, that the
court regards as incidental to office.
Language in a third case, Ashmore v. Greater Greenville
Sewer District,22 indicated that ex officio office holding can be a
permissible legislative activity. At issue in Ashmore was an act
creating a Board of Trustees whose duties were to build, maintain
and manage a city auditorium. The Board was comprised of a
labor representative chosen by the county delegation, the county
senator, the city mayor, the chairman of the County Board Com-
mission, the presidents of the local service and business organiza-
tions, and a member of the county delegation. Although the court
found that the legislation impermissibly intruded upon executive
powers, it stated that "[a] governing Board . . . might be
properly created by appointment ex officio of officers of the sepa-
rate governmental units whose duties of their respective officers
18. Id. at 357, 132 S.E. at 677.
19. Id.
20. 186 S.C. 134, 195 S.E. 257 (1938).
21. Id. at 149, 195 S.E. at 264.
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[sic] have reasonable relation to their function ex officio."2
In McLeod the court relied on two factors to uphold the
Board's composition. First, the legislature's ratification of the
identical separation of powers provision in 1970, as part of the
constitutional amendment process 24 and subsequent to two iden-
tical holdings on the issue, 25 "expressed contentment of the Gen-
eral Assembly, not merely with the separation of powers principle
as originally expressed, but with those words as then judicially
construed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. ' 26 Some case
law supports this means of supporting a decision.Y Second, put-
ting the Board's legislative members in a minority position en-
sured that they could not exert excess power or influence over the
Board's activities.2 Their participation on the Board, the court
said, was reasonably incidental to their official duties because it
was a "cooperative effort [of] making their expertise available
to the executive. ' 2 This language added an additional factor,
exchange of expertise, to the range of permissible legislative ac-
tivity in the executive realm."
Whether the functions of the legislative members of the State
Budget and Control Board truly comport with the Blease test
must be examined. To determine whether a "cooperative effort"
is indeed incidental to these legislators' offices, an inquiry into
the duties of the chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee and
House Ways and Means Committee is necessary. These positions
are not created by statute, nor are their functions set forth
therein. The General Assembly, however, requires these officers
to serve in an ex officio capacity as members of a number of
governmental bodies. These are, in addition to the State Budget
and Control Board, the Judicial Council,3' the Disaster Prepared-
ness Advisory Council,3 2 the legislative Audit Council,3 and the
23. Id. at 92, 44 S.E.2d at 95.
24. 1970 S.C. Acts, 2684.
25. See note 11, supra.
26. 269 S.C. at 81, 236 S.E.2d at 408.
27. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); City of Orangeburg v. South-
ern Ry. Co., 45 F. Supp. 734 (D.S.C. 1942), affd, 134 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1943).
28. 269 S.C. at 82-83, 236 S.E.2d at 408-09.
29. Id. at 83, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
30. No precedent for this factor was present in South Carolina case law; instead, the
court looked to the law of another jurisdiction and relied on State ex rel. Schneider v.
Bennett, 218 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-27-20 to -30 (1976).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-5-30 (1976).
33. Id. § 2-15-10.
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Reorganization Commission.34 These appointments indicate that
the chairmen often function as liaisons between the legislative
and other branches of government. Their specialized functions
distinguish McLeod from Ashmore, in which members of the leg-
islature at large assumed broad duties that had only a territorial
relationship to their offices. The chairmen's "cooperative efforts"
as liaisons seem reasonably related to the duties of their offices.
Clearly, then, the South Carolina Budget and Control Board's
composition does not offend the separation of powers doctrine as
developed in South Carolina.
I1. NONATTORNEY MAGISTRATES
In State v. Duncan35 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
jected a convited criminal defendant's challenge to the use of
nonattorney magistrates on equal protection 36 and due process
grounds. This latter issue is a difficult one that has been a source
of controversy in other jurisdictions. Although most holdings
favor the constitutionality of the practice31 California strongly
dissents from the majority view.3s The question is close because
federal constitutional law can be read to support both views.
When a defendant's liberty is at stake, a good argument
exists favoring trial before a judicial officer with a legal educa-
tion. Partly because of the complexity of modern criminal proce-
dure and substantive law,39 criminal defendants already possess
a sixth amendment right to representation by counsel at every
critical stage of the criminal process where their substantial
rights may be affected."0 If counsel is necessary to safeguard a
defendant's right to a fair trial, a person equally knowledgeable
34. Id. § 1-19-60.
35. 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977).
36. Defendant argued that he was denied equal protection because some counties in
South Carolina have attorney magistrates. Because this situation was not created by state
action, the defendant did not have a claim on this ground. Id. at 520, 238 S.E.2d at 209.
37. See, e.g., Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440 P.2d 1000 (1968);
State v. Boone, 218 Kan. 482, 543 P.2d 945 (1975); Ditty v. Hampton, 90 S.W.2d 772 (Ky.
1972); Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553 (1976); In Re Application of Hewitt,
81 Misc.2d 202, 365 N.Y.S.2d 760 (County Ct. 1975); State v. Pfeiffer, 25 Or. App. 45,
548 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1976); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. 1975); Thomas v.
Justice Court, 538 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1975).
38. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
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in the law should be required to hear arguments, admit evidence
and rule on questions of law. Otherwise, a defendant's rights to a
fair trial and representation by counsel become meaningless.4
The danger is not one to be corrected by appellate courts on a
case-by-case basis because a reasonable probability of prejudice
is arguably present whenever a criminal defendant is tried by a
nonattorney magistrate.42 Any procedure that can reasonably be
expected to result in prejudice must yield to the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of due process of law.4"
The argument against a blanket requirement that all magis-
trates hearini criminal cases be attorneys is based on the proposi-
tion that fundamental fairness, not absolute perfection in the
criminal process,44 is the essence of due process.45 A fair and im-
partial trial, then, fulfills the due process requirement. The
United States Supreme Court upheld a procedure that allows
nonattorneys to determine the existence of fourth amendment
probable cause and to issue arrest warrants, as long as the nonat-
torney is neutral and detached." Hence, to ensure that fair proce-
dures are observed in criminal proceedings only impartiality is
required, not a legal education." Because due process safeguards
are provided, a conviction by a nonattorney magistrate should be
overturned on due process grounds only when it appears that the
defendant was actually prejudiced by the magistrate's lack of
legal acumen."
The United States Supreme Court issued a narrow holding
on the issue of the constitutionality of nonattorney magistrates in
North v. Russell.49 North was an appeal from a sentence imposed
by a nonattorney judge presiding over a Kentucky police court.
State procedure provided as a matter of right for a trial de novo
before an attorney judge. Although appellant-defendant argued
that any trial before a nonattorney judge violates due process, the
Court confined its holding to the context of Kentucky procedure.
41. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
42. Id.
43. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
44. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); State v. Boone, 218 Kan. 482, 543 P.2d
945 (1975); Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553 (1976).
45. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
46. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
47. Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 885
(1973).
48. State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977).
49. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
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The right to a trial de novo and defendant's entitlement to bail
while awaiting the new trial were the factors that persuaded the
Court to uphold the Kentucky system." It also noted that prior
decisions concerning nonattorney judicial officers emphasized
impartiality rather than level of education.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court was faced in Duncan
with the issue expressly left undecided in North: the constitution-
ality of trial before a nonattorney magistrate when the defendant
has no right to a trial de novo before an attorney judge.52 The
court was persuaded by the arguments favoring use of these judi-
cial officers. Three factors were highly relevant to the decision.
First, under South Carolina procedure, a criminal defendant con-
victed in magistrate's court has a right to a two-step appeal to
the circuit53 and State supreme courts. 4 Second, the South Caro-
lina Office of Court Administration provides magistrates with
opportunities for legal education.5 Third, magistrates in this
state are paid fixed salaries; they receive none of the fees collected
by their courts.5' The court believed that these safeguards assured
thaf due process is accorded every criminal defendant convicted
in a South Carolina magistrate's court.
The factors appear convincing when abstractly stated. When
viewed in the context of actual South Carolina practice and pro-
cedure, however, whether the factors truly afford due process
safeguards to a criminal defendant tried in a nonattorney magis-
trate's court is unclear. Although varied educational opportuni-
ties are available to nonattorney magistrates, they are required
to attend only a single five-day orientation and a yearly two-day
conference. Whether this limited instruction suffices to properly
prepare nonattorneys to deal with thorny issues of constitutional
law is questionable. Moreover, evidence indicates that despite the
existence of training programs in many states, most nonattorney
magistrates simply are not knowledgable on rudimentary legal
issues."
50. Id. at 335.
51. Id. at 337.
52. 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-3-70 (1976).
54. Id. § 18-9-10.
55. 269 S.C. at 518, 238 S.E.2d at 208.
56. Id. at 516, 238 S.E.2d at 207. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-7-30 to -40 (1976).
57. Interview with John C. Patrick, Im, Staff Attorney with the South Carolina Office
of Court Administration (Nov. 13, 1978). Voluntary short courses on various topics are also
offered to magistrates.
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The court in Duncan found that any errors at trial could be
corrected by South Carolina's two-step appeal procedure. Two
complications arise, however. First is the question of the kind of
record available on appeal. Although magistrates' courts are not
courts of record, the judge is required to reduce the testimony to
writing." Apparently this is often done from memory." Given a
lay magistrate's possible lack of legal knowledge and inevitable
human fallibility, an incomplete appellate record is a distinct
possibility. Second, the untrained lay magistrate may neglect to
inform the criminal defendant of basic constitutional rights, spe-
cifically the iight to counsel. This was defendant Duncan's con-
tention.6 If a defendant is not represented by counsel and the
magistrate does not inform him of his right of appeal, he is likely
to remain ignorant of that right. If appeal is not properly taken,
defendant will be unable to challenge his conviction by petition-
ing for post-conviction relief. The South Carolina Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act" has been construed to disallow attack
of a conviction on the ground that the defendant was not in-
formed of his right to appeal. 3
The position taken in California seems to be better than that
of the South Carolina court. Duncan held that an actual preju-
dice standard applied to this issue.64 The court seems to have
been influenced by the now-discredited notion that due process
claims against the states should always be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. 5 No standard criteria can be prospectively applied
when denials of due process are tested on the facts of particular
cases. The United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed
the principle that safeguards must be imposed whenever a rea-
sonable probability of unfair proceedings is present. 6 This rea-
sonable probability almost certainly exists under current South
Carolina practice. Although North notes that diverse state prac-
tices should not be voided simply because they differ from a
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-790 (1976).
60. See report of the Honorable Nathan H. Brown, Magistrate for Georgetown
County, Record at 10-12, State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977).
61. 269 S.C. at 512, 238 S.E.2d at 206.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (1976).
63. Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 217, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975). For a full discussion of
Simmons, see Criminal Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 28 S.C.L. Rav. 290,
302-07 (1976).
64. 269 S.C. at 520, 238 S.E.2d at 209.
65. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 315 U.S. 791 (1942).
66. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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practice that may be more desirable, 7 South Carolina's use of
nonattorney magistrates probably exceeds constitutional limits.
Elizabeth C. Lipson
67. 427 U.S. 328, 338 n.6 (1976).
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